Opinion: 472 U.S. 479 (1985)

HOLDING:  The Petition Clause of the First Amendment does not grant absolute immunity for libelous statements in petitions to government officials and petitions to the President that contain intentional and reckless falsehoods do not enjoy constitutional protection.

After the general election of 1980, David I. Smith sought appointment to the position of United States Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina.  Robert McDonald sent two letters to President Ronald Reagan intended to discourage Smith’s appointment and containing allegedly “false, slanderous, libelous, inflammatory and derogatory statements,” including claims of extortion and blackmail.  Smith alleged that McDonald knew these assertions were false and that because of them he was not selected to serve as a U.S. Attorney.

Smith sued McDonald for libel.  McDonald moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, which grants the right to make a complaint to the government without fear of punishment, gave McDonald absolute immunity to write letters to the president concerning the fitness of a candidate for U.S. Attorney.  The District Court denied McDonald’s motion, noting that while McDonald’s letters fell “within the general protection afforded by the petition clause,” the clause does not grant absolute immunity from liability for libel.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court, and the Supreme Court agreed.  The Supreme Court held that the Framers of the First Amendment did not intend for the Petition Clause, or any other part of the First Amendment, to grant absolute immunity.  As such, “[t]he Petition Clause does not provide absolute immunity to defendants charged with expressing libelous and damaging falsehoods in petitions to Government officials,” and “petitions to the President that contain intentional and reckless falsehoods do not enjoy constitutional protection.”